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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Paragraph 8 and Schedule B of the Subcontract make 
payment to F.M. Electric due on the 10th day of the month following 
payment by UDOT to Wadsworth.1 
2. Whether or not the award of attorneys fees to Wadsworth, 
McNeil and American Casualty was appropriate under Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Whether appellant is entitled to an award of attorneys 
fees under Rule 11, U.R.C.P. 
Standard Of Review 
Since no evidence of any genuine issue of material fact was 
presented below, this Court reviews the trial court's decision for 
correctness as a matter of law. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 
P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, & RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
1
 Wadsworth contends that this issue is moot inasmuch as 
final payment, with interest, was made by Wadsworth to F.M. 
Electric on June 23, 1992. F.M. Electric Brief, page 14, n 1. See 
also R. 281-95; Addendum 3. Since F.M. Electric admits that it has 
received final payment, with interest, the issue as to when payment 
was due under the subcontract is moot and academic. It is 
axiomatic that "the Courts are not a forum for hearing academic 
contentions or rendering advisory opinions." Baird v. State, 574 
P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978); Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 
412, 417, 375 P.2d 756 (1962). 
1 
statutes, ordinances or rules relative to the issues in this case. 
Wadsworth submits that the case authorities referenced by F.M. 
Electric are not dispositive and are distinguishable both factually 
and legally. The legal authorities relied upon by Wadsworth are 
discussed in the Argument section of this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal by plaintiff F.M. Electric Company from a 
Summary Judgment entered by the Circuit Court in favor of 
defendants Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, McNeil 
Construction Company and American Casualty of Reading, PA. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition By Trial Court 
This action arises out of a Utah Department of Transportation 
("UDOT") Highway Construction Project known as Tremonton to 
Plymouth, Project No. I-ID-15-8(87)(380). Wadsworth was the 
general contractor on the project and F.M. Electric was a sub-
contractor of Wadsworth. This action involves a dispute between 
Wadsworth and F.M. Electric as to when final payment to F.M. 
Electric was due under the terms and provisions of the Subcontract 
Agreement. Final payment was made to F.M. Electric, with interest, 
on June 23, 1992. R. 281-83, 295; F.M. Electric Brief, p. 14; 
Addendum 3. 
F.M. Electric filed this action on January 22, 1992. R. 1. 
On May 22, 1992, Wadsworth filed its Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon the provisions of the written Subcontract Agreement. R. 
101. Wadsworth supported its Motion with affidavits from Kip 
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Wadsworth, the general manager of Wadsworth. R. 99,227; Addendum 
1, 2. On May 22, 1992, F.M. Electric filed its Opposition to 
Wadsworth's Motion for Summary Judgment and its own Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment, R. 111. F.M. Electric filed no affidavits 
or other evidence contradicting the affidavits of Kip Wadsworth or 
otherwise supporting its position in this matter. 
Shortly after the motions for summary judgment were filed, 
Wadsworth took the initiative to resolve this matter and to reduce 
the costs incurred by the parties. Although the undisputed intent 
of the parties under the Subcontract Agreement was that payment was 
due to F.M. Electric after Wadsworth received final payment from 
UDOT, Wadsworth nevertheless offered to make full payment to F.M. 
Electric with interest from the date F.M. Electric completed its 
work. F.M. Electric refused to settle for full payment with 
interest and determined to persist in its pursuit of this lawsuit. 
In an effort to avoid further vexation by this lawsuit which 
Wadsworth considered to be groundless, and not withstanding F.M.'s 
refusal to settle, Wadsworth made final payment, with interest, to 
F.M. Electric on June 23, 1992. R. 281-83, 295; Addendum 3; F.M. 
Electric Brief, p.14. 
Notwithstanding Wadsworth's payment to F.M. Electric in full 
and with interest, F.M. Electric persisted in pursuing this action 
and filed a Notice to Submit the Motions for Summary Judgment for 
decision on August 17, 1992. R. 311. 
On September 8, 1992, the Court entered its Memorandum 
decision granting Wadsworth's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
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denied F.M. Electric's Motion. R. 318. The Court based its 
decision on the affidavits of Kip Wadsworth and the Subcontract 
provisions. R. 318. The Court found that the Complaint of F.M. 
Electric was filed without merit and that Wadsworth, McNeil and 
American Casualty were all entitled to reasonable attorneys fees. 
R. 318. On October 13, 1992, the Court entered its Judgment 
dismissing the Complaint and awarding reasonable attorneys fees to 
defendants. R. 330-33. F.M. Electric filed its Notice of Appeal 
on November 12, 1992. R. 336. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prior to January 29, 1990, Wadsworth entered into a 
contract with the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") for 
construction of a UDOT Highway Project known as Tremonton to 
Plymouth, Project No. I-ID-15-8(87)(380) Wadsworth then entered 
into a Subcontract Agreement with F.M. Electric for a portion of 
the work. A true and correct copy of the relevant portions of the 
Subcontract Agreement is attached to the Affidavit of Kip Wadsworth 
attached herewith as Addendum l.2 
2. Paragraph 8 of the Subcontract Agreement provides in 
pertinent part: 
The contractor agrees to pay to the sub-
contractor for the satisfactory completion of 
the herein described work the sum of .... in 
monthly payments of 95% of the work performed 
in any proceeding month, in accordance with 
2
 F.M. Electric incorrectly states that it entered into a 
contract with Wadsworth and McNeil. The Subcontract Agreement was 
entered into by F.M. Electric only with Wadsworth and not McNeil. 
R. 99. 
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estimates prepared by the subcontractor and as 
approved by the contractor and owner or its 
designated representative: such payments to be 
made as payments are received by the 
contractor from the owner covering the monthly 
estimates of the contractor, including the 
approved portion of the subcontractor's 
monthly estimate. (Emphasis added). 
R. 99; Addendum 1. 
3. Schedule B of the Subcontract Agreement provides: 
Subcontractor shall be paid as the progress 
payments are received by the prime contractor 
for the subcontractor's portion of the work. 
Payment shall be due on the 10th day of the 
month following payment to the prime 
contractor. Retention shall be 5% until 
reduced by the owner, and reduced thereafter 
to the same percentage retained by the owner 
against the prime contractor. (Emphasis 
added). 
R. 99; Addendum 1. 
4. As of the filing of this action, UDOT had not yet paid 
Wadsworth the final retention amount including the retention held 
for work performed by F.M. Electric. R. 227. 
5. At all times, Wadsworth fully intended to make final 
payment to F.M. Electric promptly upon receiving the final payment 
from UDOT as provided under the Subcontract Agreement. As of May 
12, 1992, Wadsworth had not made final payment to F.M. Electric 
because Wadsworth had not received payment from UDOT. R.227. 
Under the Subcontract with F.M. Electric, final payment was not due 
to F.M. Electric until after Wadsworth received final payment from 
UDOT. R. 227, Addendum 2. 
6. In March of 1992, Kip Wadsworth personally telephoned 
Frank Montoya at F.M. Electric to discuss this matter. Mr. 
5 
Wadsworth discussed with Mr. Montoya the fact that the Subcontract 
upon which this action is based specifically stated that F.M. 
Electric was not entitled to payment until after Wadsworth received 
payment from UDOT. Mr. Montoya did not dispute this fact. R. 99; 
Addendum 1. As of the filing of this action, Wadsworth had paid to 
F.M. Electric all amounts under its Subcontract on the UDOT Highway 
Project except for the retention amount of $5,114.31, which was 
still being retained by UDOT and had not been released to 
Wadsworth. R. 99,227; Addendum 1, 2. 
7. All of Wadsworth's other subcontractors on this project 
acknowledged that they were not entitled to payment and release of 
final retention until UDOT released the retention amounts and made 
final payment to Wadsworth. R. 227; Addendum 2. 
8. Although the Subcontract Agreement clearly provided that 
Wadsworth was not required to make final payment to F.M. Electric 
until final payment was made by UDOT to Wadsworth, and 
notwithstanding F.M. Electric7s acknowledgement of this fact, 
Wadsworth attempted to avoid further proceedings in this law suit 
and unnecessary costs of litigation and made final payment to F.M. 
Electric with interest on June 23, 1992.3 R. 281-83, 295; Addendum 
3. 
9. F.M. Electric persisted, nevertheless in pursuing this 
action even though it had been paid in full, with interest, on June 
3
 Counsel for F.M. Electric acknowledged payment in a letter 
to the Circuit Court on July 21, 1992. Counsel for F.M. Electric 
stated: "F.M. Electric acknowledges that by way of check dated 
June 15, 1992, it was paid the principle amount due it under the 
Contract, together with interest thereon." R. 295. 
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23, 1992. R. 295, 311. 
10. After F.M. Electric filed its Notice of Appeal in this 
matter, all three defendants in this matter offered to waive and 
release the trial court's award of attorneys fees if F.M. Electric 
would dismiss this appeal. Again, notwithstanding the fact that 
F.M. Electric had previously been paid in full, with interest, F.M. 
Electric determined nevertheless to continue to pursue this action 
and declined the offer of defendants. Addendum 4. 
11. F.M. Electric incorrectly asserts that appellees do not 
dispute F.M. Electric's entitlement to final payment. Wadsworth 
has always maintained that payment to F.M. Electric was not due 
until the tenth day of the month following payment by UDOT to 
Wadsworth. 
12. F.M. Electric incorrectly asserts that the Subcontract 
Agreement was prepared solely Wadsworth. There is no factual basis 
for this allegation. A review of the Subcontract form clearly 
indicates that certain provisions were deleted and interlineated by 
the parties in the process of arriving at the final Subcontract 
Agreement. R. 95, 99; Addendum 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plain and ordinary meaning of the Subcontract Agreement 
between Wadsworth and F.M. Electric is that payment from Wadsworth 
to F.M. Electric was due ten days after Wadsworth received payment 
of such work from UDOT. The Subcontract Agreement contains no 
language whatsoever relative to the arguments by F.M. Electric that 
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payment be made within "a reasonable time" after completion of the 
work or "upon" completion of the work. The contract unambiguously 
and expressly states that payment to F.M. Electric was "to be made 
as payments are received by" Wadsworth from UDOT and that "payment 
shall be due on the tenth day of the month following payment to the 
prime contract". R. 95, 99, Addendum 1. F.M. Electric seeks to 
have this Court rewrite the Subcontract provisions regarding 
payment and interpret the Subcontract contrary to the plain meaning 
of its terms. 
The award of attorneys fees to defendants was proper under 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and otherwise for 
several reasons. First, this action was filed by F.M. Electric for 
the apparent reason harassing and coercing Wadsworth in making 
payment which otherwise was not due. Although F.M. Electric did 
not dispute that the intent of the parties was that Wadsworth would 
make payment after it received payment from UDOT, F.M. Electric 
filed this action in an apparent attempt to pressure Wadsworth to 
pay early. Mr. Montoya and F.M. Electric knew what the intent of 
the parties was under the Subcontract Agreement and that there was 
no factual basis for this law suit. The vexatious purpose of F.M. 
Electric is evidenced in its pursuit of this matter long after 
receipt of full payment with interest. 
The judgment of the Circuit Court dismissing the Complaint of 
F.M. Electric and awarding Wadsworth its reasonable attorneys fees 
should be affirmed and Wadsworth should further be awarded its 




THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT BETWEEN WADSWORTH AND F.M. 
ELECTRIC CLEARLY AND UNABMIGOUSLY PROVIDES THAT PAYMENT 
WAS TO BE MADE TO F.M. ELECTRIC AS PAYMENTS WERE RECEIVED 
BY WADSWORTH FROM UDOT AND THAT PAYMENT WAS DUE ON THE 
TENTH DAY OF THE MONTH FOLLOWING PAYMENT TO WADSWORTH BY 
UDOT. 
The Subcontract plainly and unambiguously provides that F.M. 
Electric is to receive payment from Wadsworth of the retention 
funds held by UDOT only as Wadsworth received such payment from 
UDOT. Paragraph 8 of the Subcontract provides in pertinent part: 
The contractor agrees to pay the subcontractor 
for the satisfactory completion of the herein 
described work the sum of .... in monthly 
payments of 95% of the work performed in any 
proceeding month, in accordance with estimates 
prepared by the subcontractor and as approved 
by the contractor and owner or its designated 
representative: such payments to be made as 
payments are received by the contractor from 
the owner covering the monthly estimates of 
the contractor, including the approved portion 
of the subcontractors monthly estimates. 
(Emphasis added). 
R. 95, 99; Addendum 1. 
Additionally, Schedule B of the Subcontract specifically 
provides that payment is due to F.M. Electric on the "tenth day of 
the month following payment" to Wadsworth by UDOT. 
Subcontractor shall be paid as the progress 
payments are received by the prime contractor 
for the subcontractors portion of the work. 
Payment shall be due on the tenth day of the 
month following payment to the prime 
contractor. Retention shall be 5% until 
reduced by the owner, and reduced thereafter 
to the same percentage retained by the owner 
against the prime contractor. (Emphasis 
added). 
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R. 95, 99; Addendum 1. 
Payment from Wadsworth to F.M. Electric is specifically and 
expressly made "due on the tenth day of the month following payment 
to the prime contractor". As of the time of this action, and as of 
the date Wadsworth made payment in order to avoid further 
proceedings in this litigation, UDOT had not yet released final 
payment to Wadsworth or released the retention held by UDOT for the 
work of F.M. Electric. R. 99, 227. Accordingly, final payment to 
F.M. Electric of the retention amount was not yet due. 
Furthermore, both the above provisions require approval and 
action by UDOT for payment to F.M. Electric. Paragraph 8 provides 
that pay estimates of F.M. Electric will be paid "as approved by" 
UDOT. As of June 25, 1992, UDOT had not approved F.M. Electric7s 
final pay estimate. R. 99, 227; Addendum 1, 2. Schedule B also 
provides that retention shall be 5% until reduced by UDOT and then 
reduced to the same percentage retained by UDOT from Wadsworth. 
The claimed in this action by F.M. Electric was the final retention 
amount withheld by UDOT from Wadsworth. R. 227; Addendum 2. 
Clearly, this small percentage of the total Subcontract price was 
not due until released by UDOT. 
A. The Plain Meaning of the Subcontract is that Payment was Due 
to F.M. Electric after UDOT paid Wadsworth for F.M. Electric's 
work* 
It is fundamental that the Subcontract must be enforced 
according to the plain meaning of its language. Pucrh v. Stockdale 
& Co., 570 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1977); Commercial Building Corp. v. 
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Blair, 565 P.2d 776 (Utah 1977). The meaning of Paragraph 8 and 
Schedule B of the Subcontract could not be more plain and clear. 
Payment was due on the tenth day of the month following receipt of 
payment by Wadsworth to UDOT. R. 95,99; Addendum 1. 
F.M. Electric contends that payment was to be "upon" 
completion of the work. The contract simply does not say this. The 
cardinal rule in determining the meaning of the contract is to 
determine the intent of the parties from the text of the contract 
itself. L.D.S. Hospital v. Capital Life Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 
857, 858 (Utah 1988). Paragraph 8 provides that payment shall be 
made for satisfactory completion of the work, such payment being 
due as payments were approved by UDOT and received by Wadsworth. 
Again, Schedule B specifically makes payment due on the tenth day 
of the month following receipt of payment by Wadsworth. F.M. also 
contends that payment was required "within a reasonable time" after 
completion of the work. Again, no such language appears anywhere 
in the provisions of the Subcontract. Where the Subcontract 
contains a specific provision for when performance is due, the 
Courts will not infer a "reasonable time" as claimed by F.M. 
Electric. Watson v. Hatch. 728 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1986). 
It is undisputed, that the intent of the Subcontract was that 
F.M. Electric would be paid only after Wadsworth received payment 
for the work from UDOT. R. 99. All of Wadsworth's other 
Subcontractors acknowledged this to be the intent of the 
Subcontract. R. 227; Addendum 2. In Mr. Wadsworth's discussions 
with Frank Montoya of F.M. Electric, Mr. Montoya himself did not 
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dispute that this was the intent of the contract. R. 99. 
F.M. Electric would have the Court rewrite the unambiguous 
provisions of the Subcontract contrary to well established 
principles of contract interpretation in the State of Utah. 
....Neither of the parties, nor the Court has 
any right to ignore or modify conditions which 
are clearly expressed merely because it may 
subject one of the parties to hardship, but 
they must be enforced "in accordance with the 
intention...as manifested by the language used 
by the parties to the contract.... 
It would defeat the very purpose of formal 
contracts to permit a party to invoke the use 
of words or conduct inconsistent with its 
terms to prove that the parties did not mean 
what they said. 
Ephriam Theatre Company v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958) 
(Citations omitted) (Emphasis added). The Subcontract plainly 
provides that payment to F.M. Electric was due after Wadsworth 
received final payment from UDOT. There is no provision in the 
contract that Wadsworth is required to make payment "upon" 
completion of the work or "within a reasonable time" as contended 
4
 The purpose of these provisions making payment to F.M. 
Electric due only after Wadsworth received payment from UDOT is 
obvious under the circumstances of this case. Where UDOT is 
holding approximately $350,000 of Wadsworth's retention funds, 
Wadsworth can ill afford to be required to make substantial 
payments to all of its subcontractors until UDOT processes and 
approves such payment and until such funds are made available to 
Wadsworth. All of Wadsworth's other subcontractors acknowledge 
this. R. 227. It is significant to note that while F.M. Electric 
had approximately $5,000 withheld as retention by UDOT (R. 99, 227; 
Addendum 1, 2.) Wadsworth was waiting for payment of approximately 
$350,000 from UDOT. R.99. The hardship and equities in this case 
are manifestly upon Wadsworth which had the much larger amount 
outstanding and due from the State of Utah. 
12 
by F.M. Electric. 
B. The Circuit Court's Decision is Consistent with Utah Law, 
In addition to the plain and clear meaning of the payment 
clauses in the Subcontract, Utah law is consistent with the 
decision of the Circuit Court. The Utah Prompt Payment Act, Utah 
Code Anno., §15-6-1 et seq. (1983), provides that a Subcontract or 
of a contractor for the State of Utah is to be paid within 30 days 
after the contractor receives payment from the State of Utah. Utah 
Code Ann., §58-55-16, also provides for payment by contractors to 
their subcontractors in proportion to the amounts paid to the 
contractor by the owner of the project. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that when payment 
is to be made under a contract from a particular fund, no 
obligation for such payment arises until such fund is realized and 
received by the party to make payment. Zorn v. Sweet, 295 P. 242 
(Utah 1931); Johnson v. Geddes. 161 P. 910 (Utah 1916); See also, 
Brimmed v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 81 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1936). 
In this case the Subcontract specifically provides for payment to 
F.M. Electric from the funds received by Wadsworth from UDOT for 
the work performed by F.M. Electric. R. 95,99; Addendum 1. 
In Zorn v. Sweet. 296 P 242 (Utah 1931) , the Utah Supreme 
Court addressed a contract provision similar to this case for 
payment by the promisor when it received certain payment from the 
owner. The Court held that payment from the promisor was not due 
until it received payment and dismissed the plaintiff's Complaint. 
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In that case the defendant had entered into an agreement for 
construction of certain improvements on mining property for the 
owner of the property. The defendant in turn, entered into a 
contract with the plaintiff whereby plaintiff provided funds to be 
used for such improvements. The agreement provided that defendant 
would pay such amounts to plaintiff from the amounts of mining 
profits received from the owner of the property. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's contention 
that the agreement created an absolute promise to pay the amounts 
to the plaintiff and held that the defendant had no obligation to 
make payment to plaintiff unless payment was received by the 
defendant from the owner's profits. The Court held: 
It is quite generally held, in the absence of 
facts or circumstances showing the contrary, 
that a promise which was restricted to pay out 
of a particular fund does not create an 
absolute liability. 
Id. at 244. Similarly, in this case, Wadsworth promised to pay 
F.M. Electric out of the funds paid by UDOT to Wadsworth and until 
the final retention funds of F.M. Electric were released by UDOT 
and received by Wadsworth, Wadsworth had no obligation to make 
payment to F.M. Electric. 
In Johnson v. Geddes, 161 P. 910 (Utah 1916) , the Utah Supreme 
Court similarly held that a provision in a contract for payment out 
of certain funds created no obligation for payment until such funds 
were received by the promisor. The Court held that the "Courts are 
created to enforce and not to make contracts". Id. at 913. The 
Court noted that there was no provision in the contract for payment 
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"within a reasonable time" as alleged by the plaintiffs. In this 
regard, the Court held: 
There is, however, nothing in the contract, 
that obligates the defendants to do so at any 
time or within what one else might consider to 
be a reasonable time. If the plaintiffs had 
desired such a contract they should have 
demanded it when the option was given to the 
defendants, and the latter could then either 
have accepted or declined the proposed 
conditions. 
Id. at 914. Likewise, plaintiff7s contention in this case that it 
should receive final payment within "a reasonable time" regardless 
of whether Wadsworth had received final payment and release of 
retention funds from UDOT must be rejected. If F.M. Electric 
contended such a provision it should have demanded that such 
language be inserted in the Subcontract. F.M. Electric, however, 
agreed to, and signed, the Subcontract without such provision as it 
now asserts and is bound by the plain and unambiguous terms in the 
Subcontract in its present form. 
The principles of law set forth by the Utah Supreme Court's 
Zorn decision were applied in Hood v. Gordy Holmes, Inc., 267 F.2d 
882 (4th Cir. 1959), where the Court dismissed an action similar to 
this case. There, the plaintiff subcontractor furnished lumber 
under a subcontract with the general contractor of the construction 
project owner. The subcontract provided that the plaintiff would 
be paid when the general contractor received payment of certain 
funds from the owner of the project. The owner had not paid the 
contractor, who in turn had not paid the subcontractor. Several 
years past without payment. The Court dismissed the action of the 
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subcontractor for payment against the contractor and held that the 
contractor was not liable to the subcontractor until the contractor 
received payment from the owner as specified in the subcontract. 
Our research discloses no case in South 
Carolina or any other jurisdiction, nor has 
any been cited by the plaintiff, which holds 
that where a contract requires payment to be 
made from a specified fund, the debt is 
payable, as the plaintiff insists, in a 
reasonable time even though the source fails 
without the fault of the promisor. Instead, 
the general rule appears to be as follows: 
"It is quite generally held, in the absence of 
facts or circumstances showing the contrary, 
that a promise which is restricted to pay out 
of a particular fund does not create an 
absolute liability." Zorn v. Sweet, 1931, 77 
Utah 389, 296 P. 242, 244. See also Smith v. 
Bouden, 1930, 49 Idaho 638, 290 P. 377. 
Id. at 885. Similarly, F.M. Electric is not entitled to payment of 
the retention funds from Wadsworth until such funds were released 
by UDOT and received by Wadsworth from UD0T. 
In A.A. Conte v. Campbell/Lowre/Lautermilsch, 477 N.E.2d 30 
(111. App. 1985), the Court addressed a provision in a construction 
contract providing for payment to the subcontractor when payment 
was received by the contractor from the owner of the project. The 
owner was insolvent and failed to pay the contractor. The 
contractor accordingly had not paid the subcontractor and the 
subcontractor sued the contractor. The Court held that the 
contractor was not liable to pay the subcontractor where the 
contractor had not been paid by the owner. In reaching this 
result, the Court held that it must arrive at the meaning of the 
contract by looking at the language of the contract itself and 
further held that a "Court may not rewrite a contract to suit one 
of the parties but must enforce the terms as written." Id. at 33. 
The Court held that where the language was clear and 
unambiguous, it was not for the Court to redraft the provisions of 
the contract. 
Since we have already determined that the 
language of the contract is plain and 
unambiguous, we must also conclude that the 
parties are bound by it. We note that the 
contract question was between two entities 
engaged in business and the construction 
industry and presumably often entered into 
other contractual agreements of a similar 
nature in the course of their business. While 
it is clear that with the benefit of hindsight 
Conte may have chosen to exclude or draft 
differently the language in paragraphs 5 and 
18, which give rise to this dispute, this 
Court cannot redraft the contract and we must 
enforce the contract as written and agreed 
upon by the parties. 
Id. at 33. It should be noted that the Conte Court rejected the 
reasoning in the cases cited by F.M. Electric. 
C. The Authorities Relied Upon by F.M. Electric are Inapplicable 
F.M. Electric relies upon the Restatement, (Second) of 
Contracts, §227; United Plate Glass Co. v. Trimms Industries, Inc., 
106 P.A. Commonwealth 22, 525 A.2d 468 (1987); Thomas J. Dyer Co. 
v. Bishop International Engineering Co. . 303 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 
1962) ; and other authorities which deal with allocation of risks of 
forfeiture. The issue in this case is a question of "when" payment 
is to be made and not "if" payment will be made. The authorities 
relied upon by F.M. Electric are inapplicable in a case such as 
this involving a public construction project where the State of 
Utah is the owner. There is no realistic concern as to a 
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forfeiture of payment. It is significant to note that this case 
only involves the release of F.M. Electric7s final retention of 
approximately $5,000. F.M. had already been paid all other amounts 
of its Subcontract. R. 227. 
Furthermore, these authorities deal with situations where 
there is doubt and ambiguity regarding the meaning of contract 
provisions. An example is United Plate Glass, supra. In that case 
the contract specifically provided that "final payment shall be due 
when the work described and this Subcontract is fully completed." 
The Subcontract in this case contains no such language. This is 
the language which F.M. Electric seeks to have the Court insert 
after the fact. The Subcontract in this case clearly provides that 
payment is due on the tenth day of the month following payment to 
Wadsworth by UDOT and not when the work is completed. 
Even if the Subcontract is found to be ambiguous, the result 
would be the same because the intent of the parties is undisputed. 
Mr. Wadsworth made clear that the intent was that Wadsworth would 
pay F.M. Electric after Wadsworth was paid by UDOT. There is no 
language in the contract to dispute this intent and in Mr. 
Wadsworth7s conversations with Mr. Montoya, F.M. Electric itself 
did not dispute this intent. R. 99. In Dyer, supra, the Court 
determined the intent of the parties based upon the facts and 
circumstances of that case in order to resolve the ambiguity. The 
facts as to the intent of the parties in this case are undisputed 
and support the determination by the Circuit Court. 
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D. Wadsworth Made Full Payment With Interest, within a Reasonable 
Time 
F.M. Electric claims that the Court should rewrite the 
agreement to provide for payment within a "reasonable time" after 
completion of the work. Even if the contract had included such 
language, there is absolutely no evidence that payment was not made 
within a "reasonable time" under the circumstances of this case. 
The only evidence is that F.M. Electric had been paid its entire 
contract amount except for the small retention amount retained by 
UDOT. R.227; Addendum 2. The circumstances relating to any delay 
in payment involved UDOT's documents being unavailable due to 
unrelated investigations of UDOT personnel by the U.S. attorney. 
R. 99; Addendum 1. The delay was due to no fault on the part of 
Wadsworth. Wadsworth7s payment to F.M. Electric before final 
payment was due is certainly reasonable under all the facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
E. Payment Was Not Due Under the Bond. 
F.M. Electric's argument that the payment bond supplied by 
Wadsworth requires payment prior to the time payment is due under 
the Subcontract is without merit. F.M. Electric itself admits that 
the bond represents a promise to pay "once the liability and 
default of the principle, Wadsworth and McNeil has been 
established".5 There is no default here where the payment sought 
5
 F.M. Electric brief, pg. 13. F.M. Electric's argument is 
an attempt to boot strap a meaning which is not present in the 
Subcontract. It goes without saying that a default on the part of 
Wadsworth and payment of amounts due F.M. Electric, which would 
make payment under the bond applicable, depends entirely upon when 
payment is "due" under the Subcontract. If payment is not yet due 
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is not yet due. 
F. F.M. Electric Has Waived Any Objection to the Affidavits of Kip 
Wadsworth. 
F.M. Electric now objects, for the first time on appeal, to 
consideration of the affidavits of Kip Wadsworth. F.M. Electric 
made no objection to these affidavits prior to appeal and is barred 
from now raising the issue. In Salt Lake City v. James 
Constructors, Inc. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 1988), the Court concluded 
that even an inappropriate affidavit was properly before the Court 
where the opposing party failed to object prior to appeal. 
Hood's objection to the reply affidavit is 
well taken. Mr. Keesler's affidavit quite 
clearly fails to meet the requirements of Rule 
56(e). 
However, Hood objects to the sufficiency of 
the reply affidavit for the first time on this 
appeal. It is axiomatic that matters now 
presented to the trial court may not be raised 
for the first time on appeal. By failing in 
timely fashion to object to the affidavit or 
move to strike it, Hood has waived the right 
to challenge its defects. 
Id. at 46. Accordingly, the affidavits of Kip Wadsworth are 
properly considered by the Court and any objection by F.M. Electric 
is waived. 
F.M. Electric also contends that the subcontract provision 
should be construed against Wadsworth as the drafter of the 
under the Subcontract, there is obviously no default and the bond 
had no application. 
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Subcontract.6 F.M. Electric misconstrues the rule of construction 
against the drafter. The rule only applies as "a last resort" 
where there is an ambiguity in the written contract provision.7 
Plaintiff misapprehends the doctrine that 
contract should be construed against the 
drafter. The doctrine does not operate in a 
dispositive fashion simply because ambiguity 
has been found. Once a contract is deemed 
ambiguous, the next order of business is to 
admit extrinsic evidence to aid an 
interpretation of the contract. It is only 
after extrinsic evidence is considered and the 
Court is still uncertain as to the intention 
of the parties that ambiguities should be 
construed against the drafter. In other 
words, the doctrine of construing ambiguities 
in a contract against the drafter functions as 
a kind of tie-breaker, used as a last resort 
by the fact finder after the receipt and 
consideration of all pertinent extrinsic 
evidence has left unresolved what the parties 
actually intended. Wilburn v. Interstate 
Elec, 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1988) 
(Citations omitted). 
There is no ambiguity in the Subcontract concerning when payment 
was due. The Subcontract is very clear as to when payment is due 
and none of the provisions asserted by F.M. Electric are found in 
the plain language of the subcontract. Even assuming an ambiguity 
in the Subcontract, the undisputed intent of the parties is that 
6
 It should be noted that Wadsworth and F.M. Electric deleted 
certain portions of the Subcontract for and provided by Wadsworth. 
Although F.M. Electric requested certain provisions be deleted, no 
change was made to the provisions which are the subject of this law 
suit. 
7
 F.M. Electrics position in this regard is internally 
inconsistent. On the one hand, F.M. Electric contends that Kip 
Wadsworth's affidavit should not be considered because the written 
contract "is not ambiguous." F.M. Electric Brief, p. 15. In the 
very same paragraph, F.M. Electric contends that the ambiguity 
should be construed against Wadsworth. F.M. Brief, p. 16. 
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payment was due to F.M. only after Wadsworth received payment from 
the State of Utah for work of F.M. Electric. 
POINT II 
THE CIRCUIT COURT AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO 
WADSWORTH WAS PROPER AND APPROPRIATE. 
The Circuit Court granted and awarded attorneys fees to 
Wadsworth and the other defendants under Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and 
specifically found that the Complaint was filed without merit. R. 
318. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certification by him that he had 
read the pleading, motion or other paper; that 
to the best of his knowledge, information and 
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is 
well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification/ or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed 
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or 
to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. 
The Circuit Court's award of attorneys fees under this provision is 
appropriate for several reasons. 
It is clear from the record that F.M. Electric did not 
dispute, as a factual matter, that the intent of the parties was 
that F.M. Electric was to be paid under the Subcontract after 
Wadsworth was paid by UDOT for F.M. Electric's work. R. 99; 
Addendum 1. When this subject was discussed by Mr. Wadsworth and 
Mr. Montoya, Mr. Montoya did not dispute the fact that this was the 
intent of the parties. With this in mind, it is clear that F.M. 
Electric's filing of a Complaint was for the improper purpose of 
harassing and coercing Wadsworth into making early payment of the 
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retention which was not yet approved or released by UDOT and not 
yet due. Regardless of what the cases relied upon by F.M. Electric 
may say to the intent of those parties under different contract 
provisions, the fact remains that the intent of the parties in this 
case was undisputed. Mr. Montoya knew that his action was not well 
grounded in fact. Rule 11 requires that the pleading be both well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law. F.M. Electric's 
position cannot be said to be in "good faith" when it does not 
factually dispute the intent of the parties to the Subcontract and 
where the cases relied upon contain different payment clauses. 
Additionally, Rule 11 precludes proceeding in a manner for a 
purpose to needlessly increase the cost of litigation. Wadsworth 
has made great efforts in attempting to resolve this matter and 
avoid further litigation costs. F.M. Electric has exhibited a 
vexatious attitude towards this matter and persisted in pursuing 
the matter for no apparent reason or justification other than to 
harass Wadsworth and the other defendants. In June of 1992, 
Wadsworth offered to pay F.M. Electric in full, with interest, in 
order to avoid further proceedings in this law suit. F.M. Electric 
refused. Even though payment was not yet due to F.M. Electric, 
Wadsworth nevertheless made the payment with interest to F.M. 
Electric on June 23, 1992. R. 283, 295. F.M. Electric nevertheless 
continued to pursue this matter after the final payment had been 
made. R. 295. F.M. Electric pursued the matter claiming 
attorneys fees under Rule 11 notwithstanding the undisputed intent 
of the parties. R.295. The Court granted Wadsworth's motion and 
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awarded Wadsworth and the other defendants their attorneys fees. 
R. 368. 
After the dismissal of F.M. Electrics Complaint and award to 
Wadsworth and the other defendants of their attorneys fees, 
Wadsworth continued to make efforts to end this unnecessary 
litigation and stop the increasing cost associated therewith. 
Wadsworth and the other defendants offered to waive the award of 
attorneys fees in order to stop this matter from proceeding 
further. F.M. Electric stubbornly refused this offer and insisted 
on pursuing its appeal for apparent academic purposes. Addendum 
4. 
F.M. Electric makes an obscure request that the award of 
attorneys fees to Wadsworth and the other defendants be reversed 
and that an award of attorneys fees be rendered in F.M. Electric's 
favor. F.M. Electric, however, offers absolutely no legal basis 
for an award of attorneys fees to it. The contract does not 
contain any provision for attorneys. R. 95, 99; Addendum 1. The 
only other basis for attorneys fees asserted by F.M. Electric 
before the Court below was under Rule ll.8 The standard for Rule 
11 has been discussed above. F.M. Electric, itself, effectively 
admits that Rule 11 does not apply to defendants. F.M. Electric 
admits that "it is arguably understandable how the Court below 
could find F.M. Electric's theory and argument without merit". 
F.M. Electric brief, p. 30. Where F.M. Electric's position was 
8
 Accordingly, this is the only basis which can be considered 
on appeal. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, supra. 
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found by the Court to be without merit, and where F.M. itself 
admits that the Court's finding is understandable, it goes without 
saying that Wadsworth and the other defendants were well in 
compliance with Rule 11. Accordingly, F.M. Electrics request for 
attorneys fees should be denied and Wadsworth and the other 
defendants should be awarded their continued attorneys fees and 
costs associated with this unnecessary appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Subcontract unambiguously and expressly provides that 
payment to F.M. Electric was "to be made as payments are received 
by" Wadsworth from UDOT and that "payment shall be due on the tenth 
day of the month following payment to the prime contract". The 
Subcontract contains none of the provisions F.M. Electric now seeks 
to assert. The issues relating to when payment was due under the 
Subcontract are moot in view of the fact that Wadsworth made final 
payment to F.M. Electric, with interest, on June 23, 1992. 
The award of attorneys fees to defendants was proper under 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and there is no basis 
for awarding attorneys fees to F.M. Electric. 
The Judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed and 
Wadsworth should further be awarded its reasonable attorneys fees 
and costs incurred on this appeal. 
Dated this P5g*^ tiay of April, 1993 
BEESLEY, FAIRCLOUGH, CANNON & FITTS 
Stanford P. Fitts 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing, to be mailed, postage prepaid to the following 
this 222~day of April, 1993: 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
Jeffery R. Price, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ronald Barker 
2870 South State Street 




1. Affidavit of Kip Wadsworth (Subcontract 
Agreement Attached). 
2. Second Affidavit of Kip Wadsworth. 
3. Notice of Tender of Payment (Check Attached). 
4. Letter from Walstad & Babcock, 2/8/93. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Affidavit of Kip Wadsworth 
(Subcontract Agreement Attached) 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY (0267) 
STANFORD P. FITTS (4834) 
BEESLEY, FAIRCLOUGH, CANNON & FITTS 
300 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3500 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
F.M. ELECTRIC, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, MCNEIL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY and AMERICAN CASUALTY 
OF REDDING, PA, a surety company, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIP WADSWORTH 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
KIP WADSWORTH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am the General Manager of Ralph L. Wadsworth 
Construction Company ("Wadsworth") and have personal knowledge of 
the matters stated in this Affidavit. 
1 
2. Prior to January 29, 1990, Wadsworth entered into a 
Contract with the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") for 
construction of a UDOT highway project known as Tremonton to 
Plymouth, Project No, I-ID-15-8(87)380. Wadsworth then entered 
into a subcontract with FM Electric for a portion of the work. The 
document attached herewith as Exhibit "A" is a true and accurate 
copy of the subcontract between Wadsworth and FM Electric. 
3. The subcontract provides that Wadsworth will pay FM 
Electric as Wadsworth is paid by the owner, UDOT. Although the 
project has been completed for over a year, Wadsworth has not been 
paid its final payment under the Contract of approximately 
$350,000.00. This is because the UDOT documents necessary for UDOT 
to process the final payment have been subpoenaed by the United 
States Department of Justice as part of an investigation of UDOT. 
Wadsworth is informed that the documents will be released to UDOT 
and the payment is anticipated to be processed and made to 
Wadsworth within a few months. 
4. Wadsworth fully intends to make the final payment to FM 
Electric, with interest, promptly upon receiving the final payment 
from UDOT. Wadsworth has not made final payment to FM Electric 
because Wadsworth has not received payment from UDOT. Under the 
Subcontract with FM Electric, final payment is not due to FM 
Electric until Wadsworth receives final payment from UDOT. 
2 
5. In March of 1992, I personally telephoned Frank Montoya 
at FM Electric to discuss this matter. I discussed with Mr. 
Montoya the fact that the Subcontract upon which he was suing 
specifically stated that FM Electric was not entitled to payment 
until Wadsworth received payment from the Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT"). Mr. Montoya did not dispute this fact and 
said he would call UDOT himself and see about getting payment 
released. 
Dated this lj day of May, 1992. 
Wadsworth 
-ru Subscr ibed and sworn t o be fore me t h i s JJ day of May, 1992 . 
Notary P u b l i c ^v. * /
 f, ; 
R e s i d i n g i n /f\A/m \J\ 
My Commission e x p i r e s : 
PATRICIA L 8EESLEY 
40 East Soum Temple *300 • 
Salt lake City Utah 84111 • 
My Commission Expires 12/20/94 I 
STATE OP UTAH J | 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be mailed, United States Mail, First Class, postage 
prepaid, to the following this (f day of May, 1992: 
Robert F. Babcock 
Randy B. Birch 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, # 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State Street 




Materials covered oy m:s purcnase o; 
v/;!l be used in the performance c 
contract subject lo the Preside 
F I L E G 0 P I Executive Order 11246 o-j Sec^on 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Vendc 
SU BCONTRACT AGR ESff i^eK^."9"" 
THIS AGREEMENT made at Salt Lake City
 U u l thIs
 2 9 T H 
day of 
JANUARY ?Q 9 0 h y ^ K H ^ n Ralph L. Wadsuorch Construction Company, Inc 
of S a l t Lake CX y ^ hereinafter referred to as the Contractor, and. 
F.M. ELECTRIC; 7117 SOUTH 400 WEST, SUITE #6, MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 
hereinafter referred to as the Subcontractor. We bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns 
jointly and severally firmly by these presents. 
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the covenants herein contained, the Contractor and the Subcontractor 
agree as follows: 
1. §COPE OF WORK 
That the work to be performed by the Subcontractor under the terms of this agreement consists of the following: 
Furnishing of all labor and material, tools, implements, and equipment, scaffolding, permits, fees, e t c , to do all of the 
following: 
See Schedule A ( Attached) 
When the Subcontractor does not install all material furnished under this Subcontract such material as Is not installed 
U to be delivered F.O.B. J o b s i t c
 t 
t , «,« . .. ,. . .~ ,. . . Utah Department %of Transportation in strict accordance with the plans and specifications as prepared by 
Architect and/or Engineer, for ih^ construction of P r o j e c t No . 1 - 1 0 - 1 5 - 8 ( 8 7 ) 3 8 0 ; 
Tremonton to Plymouth 
F Utah Department of Transportation 0 w n 
for which construction the Contractor has the prime contract with the Owner; together with all addenda or authorized 
changes Issued prior to the date of execution of this agreement. 
The Contractor and the Subcontractor agree to be bound by the terms of the prime contract agreement, construction 
regulations, general conditions, plans and specifieaUons, and any and all other contract documents, if any there be, insofar 
as applicable to this subcontract agreement, and to that portion of the work herein described to be performed by the Subcon-
tractor. 
In the event of any doubt or question arising between the Contractor and the Subcontractor with respect to the plans 
and specifications the decision of the Architect and/or Engineer shall be conducive and binding. Should there be no super-
vising architect over the work, then the matter in question shall be determined as provided in Section 7 of the agreement. 
/2. PROSECUTION OF WORK, DELAYS, ETC. 
The Subcontractor shall prosecute the work undertaken in a prompt And diligent, manner whenever such work or anv 
part o f it.' becomes available, or at such other time or times as the Contractor may direct, and so as to promote the rcncral 
progress o f the entire construction, and shall not , by delay or otherwise, intcrfeie with or hinder the work of the Contractor 
o r any other Subcontractor, and in the event that the Subcontractor neglects and/or fails to supply the necessary labor 
a n d / o r materials, tools , implements, equipment, etc. , in the opinion of the Contractor, then the Contractor shall notify the 
Subcontractor in writing sett ing forth the deficiency and/or delinquency, and 72 hours after date of such written notice the 
Contractor shall have the right if he so desires l o Like over the work of the Subcontractor in full, snd exclude the Subcon-
tractor from any further participation in the work covered by this agreement; or, at his option the Contractor may take 
over such portion of the Subcontractors work as the Contractor shall deem to be in the best interest of the Contractor, and 
permit the Subcontractor to continue with the remaining portions of the work. Whichever method the Contractor might e lect 
t o pursue, the Subcontractor agrees to release to the Contractor, for his use only, wi thout recourse, any materials, tools , 
implements , equipment , etc. . on the site, belonging to or in the possession o f the Subcontractor, for the benefit of the Con-
tractor, in complet ing the work covered in this agreement; and, the Contractor agrees to complete the work to the best o f 
his ability and in the most economical manner available to him at the time. Any costs incurred by the Contractor in doing 
a n y such portion o f the work covered by this agreement shall be charged against any monies due or to become due under the 
terms of this agreement, and in the event the total amount due or to become due under the terms of this agreement shall be 
ir.*-jffic:cn: to cover t!»c costs rccr::cd by the Cor.trsctcr :n c~rr.-'?.i\-~ the v.-ctk. the- ; V S-:\-.C':\'r-rtcz r.-*.d Ka. r;::-:->?, if 
a n y . shall be bound and liable unto the Contractor for the difference. 
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance of any work under this contract depend wholly or partially 
u p o n the proper workmanlike or accurate performance of any work or materials furnished by the Contractor or other subcon-
tractors o n the project, the Subcontractor agrees t o use all means necessary to discover any such defects and report same in 
writ ing t o the Contractor before proceeding with his work which is so dependent: and shall allow to the Contractor a reason-
able t ime in wnich to remedy such defects; and in the event he does not so report to the Contractor in writing, then it shall 
b e assumed that the Subcontractor has fully accepted the work o f others as being satisfactory and he shall be fully respon-
sible thereafter for the satisfactory performance of the work covered by this agreement, regardless of the defective work o f 
o thers . 
The Subcontractor shall clean up and remove from the site as directed by the Contractor, all rubbish and debris re-
sul t ing from his work. Failure to clean up rubbish and debris shall serve as cause for withholding further payment to Sub-
contractor until such time as this condition is corrected to the satisfaction of the Contractor. Also he shall clean up to the 
satisfaction o f the inspectors, all dirt, grease marks, etc. , from walls, ceilings, floors, fixtures, etc . , deposited or placed thereon 
as a result of the execution of this subcontract. If the Subcontractor refuses or fails to perform this cleaning as directed by 
the Contractor, the Contractor shall have the right and power to proceed with the said cleaning, and the Subcontractor will 
o n demand repay to the Contractor the actual cost of said labor plus a reasonable percentage of such cost to cover super-
vis ion, insurance, overhead, e t c 
The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the Contractor for any and all liquidated damages that may be assessed against 
and collected from the Contractor by the Owner, which are attributable to or caused by the Subcontractor's failure to 
furnish the materials and perform the work required by this Subcontract within the time fixed in the manner provided for 
here in , and In addition thereto, agrees to pay to the Contractor such other or additional damages as the Contractor may 
sustain by reason o f such delay by the Subcontractor. The payment of such damages shall not release the Subcontractor 
f rom his obligation to otherwise fully perform this Subcontract. 
Whenever it may be useful or necessary to the Contractor t o d o so , the Contractor shall be permitted to o c c u p y and/or 
use any portion o f the work which has been either partially or fully completed by the Subcontractor before final inspection 
a n d acceptance thereof by tKe Owner, but such use and/or occupation shall not relieve the Subcontractor o f his guarantee o f 
said work and materials nor of his obligation to make, good at his o w n expense any defect in materials and workmanship which 
m a y occur o r develop prior to Contractor's release from responsibility to the Owner. Provided, however, the Subcontractor 
shall n o t be responsible for the maintenance of such portion o f the work as may be used and/or occupied by the Contractor, 
n o r for any damage thereto that is dtie to or caused by the sole negligence o f the Contractor during such period o f use.-
Subcontractor shall be responsible for his own work, property and/or materials until complet ion and final acceptance o f 
t h e Contract b y the Owner, and shall bear the risk o f any loss or damage until such acceptance and shall pay promptly for 
all materials and labor furnished to the project. In the event of loss or damage, he shall proceed promptly to make repairs, or 
replacement o f the damaged work, property and/or materials at his o w n expense, as directed by the Contractor. Subcon-
tractor waives all rights Subcontractor might have against Owner and Contractor for loss or damage to Subcontractor's work, 
property or materials. 
It Is agreed that the Subcontractor, at the option of the Contractor, may be considered as disabled from so complying 
whenever a pet i t ion in Bankruptcy or for the appointment o f a Receiver is filed against him. 
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor assumes 
toward the Owner. The Subcontractor shall indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and save them harmless from, 
any and all loss , damage, expenses, costs, and attorneys* fees incurred or suffered on account of any breach of the provisions 
or covenants o f this contract. 
Subcontractor agrees to fully comply with the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 and any and all regulations 
issued pursuant thereto. Subcontractor as a term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and save the contractor harmless 
from any claims or charges of any kind by reason of subcontractor failing l o fully comply with the act and regulations and 
agrees to reimburse the contractor for any fines, damages, or expenses of any kind incurred by the contractor b y reason o f 
3. SURETY DOND 
!£««4>cootr«c;<or-«»i;rcc5'-i<>—f*» rn»r.l»—lo-thc— Contr^cto*— ^t^^»•>^«»|>^«>,^^r^o;or^H:Kf»c•^Cr*%-r•»»fv»^'»^«HJ-^un^An:^y»; 
4 . PERMITS. LICENSES. FEES. TAXES. ETC. 
The Subcontractor shrill, at his own cost and expense, apply for and obtain all necessary permits and licenses and shall 
conform strictly to the laws and ordinances in force in the locality where the work under the project is bcinr; done , insofar 
as applicable to work covered by this agreement. The Subcontractor shall hold harmless the prime Contractor against liability 
b y reason of the Subcontractor having failed to pay federal, state, county or municipal taxes. 
S. INSURANCE 
The Subcontractor SCTCCS to provide and maintain workmen's compensation insurance and to comply In all respects 
w i t h the employment and payment of labor, required b y >ny constituted authority having legal jurisdiction over the arc* in 
w h i c h the work is performed. * I n t h e a m o u n t o f $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 * . 
* The Subcontractor agrees to carry comprehensive public liability and property damage Insurance, and such other 
insurance as the Contractor might deem necessary, in amounts as approved by the Contractor, In order to protect the Con-
tractor and Subcontractor against loss resulting from any acts o f the Subcontractor, his agents, and /or employees . Such 
insurance shmll n o t b e less tjpn limits and coverages required in the general contract documents . * ' l n t h e a m o u n t o f n o t 
not l e s s tTian $17000,000.00. 
The Subcontractor agrees to furmsn evidence satisfactory to the Contractor, o f s u c n insurance, including copies of the 
policies , when requested to do so by the Contractor. 
All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained in full force and effect in a company or companies satisfactory 
t o Contractor, shall be maintained at Subcontractors expense until performance in full hereof (certificates of such insurance 
be ing supplied by Subcontractor to Contractor), and such insurance shall be subject to requirement that Contractor must be 
notif ied by ten ( 1 0 ) days' written notice before cancellation o f any such policy. In event o f threatened cancellation for non-
payment of premium. Contractor may pay same for Subcontractor and deduct the said payment from amounts then or sub-
sequently owing to Subcontractor hereunder. P r i m e C o n t r a c t o r a n d . O w n e r s h a l l " . b e n a m e d i n s u r e d s 
'on' the General L i a b i l i t y - P o l i c y provided by Subcontractor.• 
6. CHANGES, ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS 
The Contractor may add to or deduct from the amount o f work covered by this agreement, and any changes made in 
t h e amount o f work involved, or any other parts o f this agreement, shall be by a written amendment hereto setting forth in 
detail the changes involved and the value thereof which shall be mutually agreed upon between the Contractor and the Sub-
contractor if such be possible;and if*such mutual agreement is not possible, then the value of the work shall be determined as 
provided in Sect ion 7 of this agreement. In cither event* however, the Subcontractor agrees t o proceed with the work as 
changed when s o ordered in writing by the Contractors© as n o t to delay the progress of the work, and pending any determi-
nat ion of the value thereof. 
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional work outside the scope of this contract unless terms hereof 
shall be conclusive with respect o f this agreement between the parties hereto. Claims for ttny extras shall be made within one 
week from date of convict ion. 
The Subcontractor shall not sublet, transfer or assign this agreement or any funds due or t o b e c o m e due or any part 
thereof without the written consent of the Contractor. 
7. DISPUTES 
T h e C o i n f i i • ' j ^ — t M •••••» • .• ». • -—« " i ! ' " - ^ V J \ L^T^f* !\^' ' ••-••••*—-iii- - • ••5r-*r-»m M I ! - . »»•. . ; f f n : n : . . i A « . l . " H ' i • r\'\ 
8. PAYMENTS 
The Contractor agrees to pay-to the Subcontractor for the satisfactory completion of the herein described work th • 
cum of See Schedule -B f Arrnrnorn 
; — (S J) 
in monthly payments of 22 S> of Hie work i>crformcd in any preceding month, in accordance with estimate* 
prepared by the Subcontractor and as approved by the Contractor and < > w n c r o r JCS d e s i g n a t e d r c p r c s c n t a t ' i v 
— — : such payments to be made as payments arc received by the Contractor from the Owner 
covering the monthly estimate of the C^ptrartpr. including the approved portion of the Subcontractor's monthly estimate! 
In the event the Subcontractor docs not submit to the Contractor such monthly estimates prior to the date of submis-
sion of the Contractor's monthly estimate, then the Contractor shall include in his monthly estimate to the Owner for work 
performed during the preceding month such amount as he shall deem proper for the work of the Subcontractor for the pre-
ceding month and the Subcontractor agrees to accept such approved portion thereof as his regular monthly payment, as 
described above. 
The Subcontractor agrees to make good without cost to the Owner or Contractor any and all defects due to faulty 
workmanship and/or materials which may appear within the period so established in the contract documents; and if no such 
period be stipulated in the contract documents, then such guarantee shall be for a period of one year from date of completion 
of the project. The Subcontractor further agrees to execute any special guarantees as provided by terms of the Contract 
documents, prior to fina.1 payment. 
In the event it appears to the Contractor that the labor, material and other bills incurred in the performance of the 
work are not being currently paid, the Contractor may take such steps as it deems necessary to assure absolutely that the 
money paid with any progress payment will be utilized to the full extent necessary to pay labor, material and all other bills 
incurred in the performance of the work of Subcontractor. The Contractor may deduct from any amounts due or to become 
due to the Subcontractor any sum or sums owing by the Subcontractor to the Contractor; and in the event of any breach by 
the Subcontractor of any provision or obligation of this Subcontract, or in the extent of the assertion by other parties of any 
claim or lien against the Contractor or Contractor's Surety or the premises arising out of the Subcontractor's performance of 
•this Contract, the Contractor shall have the right, but is not required, to retain out of any payments due or to become due to 
the Subcontractor an amount sufficient to completely protect the Contractor from any and all loss, damage or expense there-
from, until the situation has been remedied or adjusted by the Subcontractor to the satisfaction of the Contractor. These 
provisions shall be applicable even though the subcontractor has posted a full payment and performance bond. 
9. TERMINATION OF CONTRACT 
In the event the prime contract between the Owner and the Contractor should be terminated prior to its completion, 
then the Contractor and Subcontractor agree that an equitable settlement for work performed under this agreement prior to 
such termination, will be made as provided by the contract documents, if such provision be made; or, if none such exist, next: 
by mutual agreement; or t failing either of these methods, fey arbitration as provided in Section 7„ 
10. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
During the performance of this subcontract, the Subcontractor agrees to not discriminate against any employee because 
of race, color, creed or national origin. As outlined in the Equal Opportunity Clause of the Regulations of Executive Order 
10925 of March 6% 1961 as amended by Executive Order 112<6 of September 24 ,1965. The executive orders and the respec-
tive regulations are made a part of this subcontract by reference. 
11 . TERMS OF LABOR AGREEMENTS 
It is hereby understood and agreed that for the work covered by this subcontract, the Subcontractor is bound and 
will comply with the terras and conditions of the labor agreements to which the general contractor is a party, insofar as said 
labor agreements lawfully require subcontractors to be so bound. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Contractor and Subcontractor signify their understanding and agreement with the terms 
hereof by affixing their signatures hereunto. 
WITNESS: 














( A d ^ X ( u ) 
F.M. ELECTRIC 
^•j (J juUconU-ciorJ 
SCHEDULE A 
Subcontractor shall furnish and provide all labor, materials, equipment and 
incidentals necessary to perform the following items of work complete, as 
per plans, specifications and addenda: 
HECL 
2" Polyvinyl Chloride Pipe Schedule 40 
Power Cable Route Marker 
Type I Junction Box Extension 
42*-0"x lO'-O" Light Pole 
Type III Luminaire, High Pressure Sodium (400 Watt 450 Yolt) 
Substation 25KYA 
1 1/2" PYCConduit (Schedule 40) 
1 1/2" PYC Conduit (Schedule 80 Roadway Crossing) 
1 112" Galvanized Rigid Steel Conduit 
2" PYCConduit (Schedule 40) 
2" PYC Conduit (Schedule 80 Roadway Crossing) 
2 1 /2" PVC Conduit (Schedule 40) 
3" PYCConduit (Schedule 40) 
3" PYC Conduit (Schedule 80 Roadway Crossing) 
6" Galvanized Rigid Steel Conduit (Railroad Crossing) 
Type I Double Junction Box 
No. 2 AWG Copper Single Conductor RHH-USE-RHW 600 Y Cable 
No. 4 AWG Copper Single Conductor RHH-USE-RHW 600 Y Cable 
No. 6 AWG Copper Single Conductor RHH-USE-RHW 600 Y Cable 
No. 2 15,000 Yolt Single Conductor Power Cable 
Ground Wire No. 6 


































25,970 Lin. Ft. 
2,025 Lin. Ft. 
250 Lin. Ft. 
2,700 Lin. Ft 
120 Lin. Ft 
150 Lin. Ft. 
1,700 Lin. Ft. 
100 Lin. Ft 
100 Lin. Ft 
165 Each 
24,160 Lin. Ft 
40.698 Lin. Ft 
5,300 L1n. Ft 
3.500 Lin. Ft 
32.175 Lin. Ft 
65 Each 
SCHEDULE P 
The Contractor shall pay the Subcontractor in current funds for the 
satisfactory performance of the following items of work (subject to 
additions and deductions authorized pursuant to paragraph 6) according to 
























25,970 Lin. Ft. 
2.025 Lin. Ft. 
250 Lin. Ft. 
2.700 Lin Ft. 
120 Lin. Ft. 
150 Lin. Ft. 
ITEM 
2" Polyvinyl Chloride 
Pipe Schedule 40 
Power Cable Route Marker 
Type 1 Junction Box Extension 







Type III Luminalre, High Pressure 
Sodium (400 Watt 480 Volt) 200.00 
Substation 25 KYA 
1 1/2" PYC Conduit 
(Schedule 40) 
1 1/2" PYC Conduit 
(Schedule 80 Roadway Crossing) 
1 l/2"0alvani2ed Rigid 
Steel Conduit 
2" PYC Conduit (Schedule 40) 
2" PYC Conduit 






















SfHFDUl F R-CONTINUFD 
Timely submittal of all required Certified Payrolls, EEO reports, 
Certificates of Insurance, and Certificates of Compliance required by the 
Owner and/or the Prime Contractor is a pre-condition to the release of all 
progress payments. 
Subcontractor shall be paid as the progress payments are received by the 
Prime Contractor for the Subcontractor's portion of the work. Payment 
shall be due on the 10th day of the month following payment to the Prime 
Contractor. Retention shall be 5% until reduced by the Owner, and reduced 
thereafter to the same percentage retained by the Owner against the Prime 
Contractor. 
R - 8 7 2 
12-23-33 Rev. 
F.M. ELECTRIC Subcontractor foi 
Project No. I-ID-15-8(87)380 has furnished to the Prime Contractoi 
their current Contractor's License No. 0000311633 
Ralph L. Wadsworch Construction Company» Inc. 
Project No. I-ID-15-8(87)380 
F.M. ELECTRIC 
Prime Contractor fox 
has furnished to the Subcontractoi 
the following attachment 
Special Provisions or Addendums: 
* 1 . Wage Rates. 
2 . Notice t o Prospective Federal-Aid Construction Con trac t o r s -
Nonsegregated F a c i l i t i e s . 
3 . Attention Contractors, E.E.O. Affirmative Action 
requirements on Federal and Federal-Aid Construction 
contracts (sheets 1 through 10) . 
4. Spec i f ic Equal Employment Opportunity R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
(Sheet 1 through 7 or 1 through 10, whichever i s 
appl icable ) . 
5. Required Contract Provis ions Federal-Aid Construction 
Contracts - Form FR-1273. 
6. Addendum F.H.W.A., Form FR-1273. 
^7. Addendum No. 1 or 2 , Sec t ion 103.02, "Sublett ing of 
Contract." 
8 . "Buy American" Prov i s ions . 
*9. Any other Special Provis ion or port ion of plan that a p p l i e s 
to a s p e c i f i c item t h a t i s being s u b l e t . 
10. Appendix A - Special Provis ion Bid Conditions Disadvantaged 
Business Enterprise (Sheets 1 through 13) 
z Items 1 (where a p p l i c a b l e ) , 7 and 9 are the on ly attachments 
required on non f e d e r a l - a i d p r o j e c t s . 
I hereby certify that I have 
received the applicable attachments, 
Special Provisions or Addendums: 
Sr&rted by duly authorized officer of 
Subcontracting firm. 
^Signed by duly authorized officer 
contracting fira. ^ 
Title 
&3L *&/* ~* / J9U&/10 President 
Date Title 




District: Construction Engineer Dt 
O . C . I / /:...-
Date Title 
Date Rec'd. in District $ /<£>/?& 1/6 
f ' " l B l i STATE OF UTAH -&^f'" i 
f. J i l l DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION ... $ 
t i j. 
OCCUPATIONAL R, PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
LICENSE •..-.•, 
fe;..< License Number: •.. .0000311633 , 
''iSSUEDTb7^ v";'.":7 
Issue Date 
0 7 / 2 6 / 8 9 
F M Elec tr i c 
) *. :-'r>'".;'.i---:."JV'•"(•..hit .I-':- • Frgn • K. Montoys 
/ • • • i i ^ : ; : ; . . ^ ^ : ; ^ : . : : 2622 Oak.'Creek Dr 
I - >%B&:i>&W.?* • S*ntfy:::, •.'-
•: . . • A ; < - > : : : s : r v - . . • • > - : : . : • . . ..- . ••• 
* CLASSIFICATION: ;. 
4 CATEGORY: - •• 
8i:::::>;;:;::^?--:::-:: 
W SEAiE0:AND>TTESTE0 
«:::;.-:;^-lft«^ .:;::• • 
• •%!';£ Expiration Date 




^ • • i v i v i S ^ / ^ ^ • .':" £'«'••'•'.;:;'£.#£:••':'":' '\ \;-: *-•SIGWURE.OFucEN^HOLC^.;,^'i;;\ 
EACH SUBCONTRACTOR W I L L BE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO aALDU L. WAOSWORTH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. INC. AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM FOR EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY WHICH COMMITS THE SUBCONTRACTOR TO SPECIFIC 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF EACH OF THE 
EEO SPECIAL PROVISIONS. 
IN LIEW OF SUBMITTING AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM TO OUR FIRM. THE 
SUBCONTRACTOR CAN CONSEHT TO ABIDE BY THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM 
OF RALPH L. WADSWORTH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY INC.'S. 
CHECK 
ONE 
D ATTACHED IS THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM OF 
THIS PROGRAM 
(Subcontractor Hame) 
HAS BEEN APPROVED BY ALL APPLICABLE AGENCIES. 
Q F M, ELECTRIC, INC. CONSENTS TO 
(Subcontractor Harae) 
ABIDE BY. AND IMPLEMENT THE AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION PLAN FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
SUBMITTED BY RALPH L. WADSWORTH ' 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. INC. 
C 'Company Offfcal / Date 
AND 
SUBCONTRACTORS CERTlRCATlOK 
It is hereby screed that the following provisions, which are also set forth in Section 202 of Executive 
Order 11246. are nude a part of each agreement and purchase order presently cxisUag or v^lch may 
be entered into hereafter, between us as subcontractor, and Ralph I . Wadsworth Const ruct ion 
Company. Inc. As used in this certification the term "subcontractor" includes the term "purchase 
order" and ail other agreements effectuating purchase of supplies or services. 
1. The subcontractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because 
of race, religion, color, sex. age. national origin or physical or mental handicap. The subcontractor 
wi l l takt affirmalivt action to ensure that the applicants are employed, and that employees are 
treated during employment, without regard to their race, religion, color, sex. age. national origin or 
physical or mental handicap. Such action shall include, but not be limited to. the advertising, layoff 
or termination, r3tes of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including 
apprenticeship. The subcontractor agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and 
applicants for employment, notices to be provided by the contracting officer setting forth the 
provisions of this nondtscriminstion clause. 
2 . The subcontractor wi l l , in all solicitations or advertisements for employees placed by or on beaalf of 
the subcontractor, state that all gualified applicants wil l receive consideration for employment 
without regard to race, religion, color, sex. age. national origin, or physical or menial handicap. 
3 . The subcontractor wil l send to each labor union or representative of workers with which he has a 
collective bargaining agreement or other contract or understanding, a notice to be provided by the 
agency contracting office, advising the labor union or workers* representative of the contractors 
commitments under Section 202 of Executive Order 11246 of September 24. 1965.. and shall post 
copies of the notice in conspicuous places available to employees and applicants for employment. 
4 . The subcontractor will comply with alt provision of Executive Order 11246 of September 24. 196S. 
and of the rules, regulations, and relevant orders of the Secretary of tabor. 
5. The subcontractor wil l furnish all information and reports required by Executive Order 11246 of 
September 24, 1965, and by the rules, regulations, and orders of the Secretary of Labor, or 
pursuant thereto, and wil l permit access to Its books, records, and accounts by the contracting 
agency and the Secretary of Labor for purposes of investigation to ascertain compliance with such 
rules, regulations, and orders. 
6. In the event of the subcontractor's noncompliance with the nondiscrimination clause of this contract 
or with any of such rules, regulations, or orders, this contract may be cancelled, terminated, or 
suspended In whole or In part and the contractor m3y be declared Ineligible for further Government 
contracts in accordance with procedures authorized In Executive Order 11246, of September 24 , 
1965, and such other sanctions may be imposed and remedies invoked as provided in Executive 
Order I1246 of September 24, 1965, or by rule, regulation, or order of the Secretary of Labor, or 
as otherwise provided by law. 
7. The subcontractor wil l Include the provisions of paragraph CO through (7) In every subcontractor 
purchase order unless exempted by rules, regulations, or orders of the Secretary of Labor issued 
pursuant to Section 204 of Executive Order 11246 of September 24. 1965. so that such provisions 
wi l l be finding upon each subcontractor or vendor. The subcontractor wi l l take such action with 
respect to any subcontract provisions Including sanctions for noncompliance: Prw&fa£, however, 
that in the event the subcontractor becomes involved in. or is threatened by the contracting agency, 
the subcontractor may request the United Stales to enter into such litigation to protect the interest 
of the United States. 
8. Subcontractor certifies to the maintenance of a written and signed affirmative action plan as 
specified in Sub-part C - Ancillary Natters; Section 60-1.40 of Rules and Regulations. Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance (EEO) Department of Labor, for each of its establishments, and certifies 
Curihtr the requirement of similar certification from each of Its nonexempt contractors. 
9. Subcontractor certifies to Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company. Inc. that tt does not 
and will not maintain or provide for its employees any segregated facilities at any of its 
catablishments and that it docs not and will not permit its employees to perform services 3t any 
location, under its control. where segregated facilities arc maintained. Subcontractor understands 
and agrees that a breach of this certification is a violation of the Equal Opportunity clause required 
by Executive Order 11246. of September 24. 196S. 
As used in this certification, the term "segregated facilities" means any waiting rooms, work areas, 
restaurants and other eating areas, time clocks, rest rooms, wash rooms. locker rooms, and other 
storage or dressing areas, parking lots, drinking fountains, recreation or entertainment areas, 
transportation or housing facilities provided for employees which are segregated by written or oral 
policies or are in fact segregated on the basis of race, religion, color, sex. age. national origin, or 
physical or msnUI handicap, because of custom or otherwise. 
Subcontractor further agrees that, except where it h3S obtained certifications from proposed 
subcontractor for specific time periods, it will obtain identical certifications from proposed 
subcontractors prior to the award of subcontractor exceeding $ 10.000 which are not exempt from the 
provisions of the Equ3l Opportunity clause, that it will retain such certifications in its files. 
£ . 0 . I I 6 2 S - MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 
1. It is the policy of the Government that minority business enterprises shall have the maximum 
opportunity to participate in the performance of Government contracts. 
2 . The subcontractor agrees to use its best efforts lo carry out this policy In the award of its 
subcontracts to the fullest extent consistent with the efficient performance of the contract. As used 
In the contract, the term "Minority Business Enterprise" means a business, at least 50 percent of 
which is owned by minority group members or. in the case of publicly owned businesses, at least Si 
percent of the stock of which is owned by minority group members, for the purposes of this 
definition, minority group members are Negroes. Spanish-speaking American persons, American 
Orientals. American Eskimos, and American Aleuts. Subcontractors may rely on written 
representations by subcontractors regarding their status as minority business enterprieses in lieu 
of an independent investigation. 
E.O. I I 7 0 ! - EMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS 
1. As provided by 41 CFR 50-250. the subcontractor agrees that all employment openings of the 
subcontractor which exist at the time of execution of this contract and those which occur during the 
performance of this contract, including those not generated by the contract and including those 
occuring at an establishment of the subcontractor other than the one wherein the contract is being 
performed but excluding those of Independently operated corporate affiliates, shall, to the maximum 
extent feasible, be offered for listing at an apporpriate local office of the Federal-State Employment 
Service system wherein the opening occurs and to provide such hires as may be required; provided, 
that this provision shall not apply lo openings which the. subcontractor fills from within the 
'subcontractor's organization or trt filled pursuant to a customary and traditional employer-union 
hiring arrangement and that the listing of employment openings shall Involve only the normal 
obligations wtlch attach to the placing of Job orders. 
2. The subcontractor agrees further to place the above provision In any subcontract directly under this 
contract. 
E.O. I (7S8 - EMPLOYMENT OF HANOICAPPEO PERSONS 
tt Is further agreed that the following provision, set forth in Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973. Is made a part of any existing or future contract between the subcontractor and Ralph L. 
Vadsworth Construction Company, inc. 
The subcontractor certifies that, in employing person to carry oot contracts entered in with Ralph 
L. Wadsworth Construction Company. Inc.. it will take affirmative action to employ 3nd 
advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals, defined as "3ny person who (3) has a 
physical or mcn(3l impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life 
activities, (b) has a record of such Impairments, or (c) Is regarded as having sucli an impairment." 
Subcontractor furtcr cerfifics that it will obtain identical certifications from proposed 
subcontractors prior to the award of subcontracts exxceding $2,500 covering the procurement of 
personal property snd nonpersonal services (Including construction). 
Date Agreed to and Certified by: 




• I intecvi to supply 100Z doacsriLc s tee l fcx: irwcoiporBtion into this project. 
a I intend to supply s t ee l that may be frxxn foreign occirin fcrr iiYxnrporatiJxx into this project. 
See special provision surface transporatioo assistance act . 
I f incorporated, the following 
information uust be given: 
State chartered under UTAH 
FRANK MONTOYA 
NPTC of President" 
VICTORIA GILBERT 
Nare F.M. ELECTRIC, INC. 
B y ^ z f i ^ 
^ 
Address ynm SOUTH UTO VEST 
MIDVALE, UTAH 8M.07 
bJaute of Secretary 
Narne of Treasurer" 
Fed. Tax tfe. 87-0^66268 
If partnership, name of partners nust be 
l i s ted belov; 
RALPH I . VWDSWOflTH CONSTRUCTION COriPANY. INC. IS RESPONSIBLE fOR 
THE ACTIONS OF A H SUBCONTRACTORS. WITH REGARD TO COMPLIANCE WITH 
EEO REGULATIONS (SECTION 10 OF SUBCONTRACT & SUBCONTRACTOR 
CERTIFICATION). TO BETTER MONITOR YOUR ACTIVITIES AND INFORM YOU OF 
YOUR OBLIGATIONS PLEASE COMPLETE THE FORM BELOW. THIS FORM SHOULD 
REFLECT YOUR COMPANY'S TOTAL WORKFORCE WtTHIN THE STATE THIS 
CONTRACT IS TO BE PERFORMED. ANY QUESTIONS PLEASE CALL 
(801)466-2376. 
I 0<S0? AfTGOMttATC BtOOC 
1 Ci CONTRA rrc*JC- a/ocoKTCAOO* 
KAA-.£ AND AOOSCss of ftQM P . M . E L E C T R I C 
7.H7 S. 400 W. SUITE #6 MIDVALE, UT 
rsssmsr 
J O O U A * AMOUNT Of CONTRACT 
f COCftAI-ACO PQOJCCT N'UMS^Q " 1 
I - ID -15 -8 (87 )380 | 
COUNIY A : 0 OiSI S I O 
1 SLC 
eCCiN^UNC COf^TCUQiOisr OAT£ 
AV 
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^U^bOkVUfr 




COMMENTS BY REYIEWER. 
R A L P H L W A D S W O R T H 
C O N S T R U C T I O N CO.. I N C . 
G E N E R A L C O N T R A C T O R S 
• 177G SOUTH MAIN STREET SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84t 15 
PHONE (801) 48G-2376 
HOME OFFICE 
D 2017 FLETCHER STREET OOlSE. I0AMO 83702 
PMONe(20C)33G-lC2t 
P J 4645 NORTH 32«d STREET. SUIT* too 
PHOENIX. ARIZONA C501C * 
Pl-tONG <C02) 4C8-2404 
RE: REQUEST FOR TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBFR 
WE ARE REQUIRED TO WITHHOLD 20% OF ALL PAYMENTS TO 
VENDORS WHO HAVE NOT PROVIDED US WITH THEIR TAXPAYER 
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER. 
THIS NUMBER IS YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IF YOU DO 
BUSINESS AS A SOLE PROPRIETOR OR YOUR FEDERAL 
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER IF YOU DO BUSINESS AS A PARTNERSHIP 
0.R CORPORATION. 
PLEASE RECORO YOUR NUMBER AND CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX 
BELOW. AND RETURN IT TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IF YOU FAIL 
TO PROVIDE US WITH THIS INFORMATION, f f f iV/LL B£ 
REQUIRED TO WITHHOLD 20Z OF ALL PAmEHTS TO rOU. 
RETURN To: RALPH L. WADSWORTH CONSTR CO. 
1776 SOUTH MAIN 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
VENDOR F.M. ELECTRIC; INC. 
CPLEASE TYPE OR PRtKT LEGIBLY) 
SOCIAL SECURITY 




YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS MATTER IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. 
THANK YOU. 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. INC. 
108.02 Subletting of Contract: Add the following paragraphc at the end 
this subsection: 
Subcontract agreements between the pri^e Contractor and the subcontraci 
or between subcontractors when applicable, vill provide for a reduction 
retained monies coxaaersurate with the percentage held as retainage against 
prime Contractor by the I>epartncnt. However, in those instances vl 
subcontracted work is commenced after the Department has reduced the percent 
of retainage withheld from the priae Contractor, the priae Contractor 
withhold 101 of the total value of work performed by the subcontractor ui 
such tine as work covered by the subcontract is 50^ cooplete at which tine 
monies retained by the prime Contractor will be reduced in accordance with 
concepts of Subsection 109.06, fourth paragraph. Retention monies withli 
from the subcontractor will then be reduced to 1 1/21 of the total value 
work to be performed by the subcontractor at the time the subcontract vork 
951 cooplete or the prime Contractor^ retention i6 reduced to this aioot 
whichever comes latest. 
The subcontract agreement shall include a statement to the effect that 
Contractor and subcontractor have agreed on a method of distribution of 
adjustments due to price increases or decreases in accordance with applica 
price adjustment specifications for fuel, cement, conuaon carrier rates, e 
Price adjustments due to the incorporation into the project work 
non-specification material or non-specification work will not fall within 
purview of these specifications. 
STATE OF UTAH 
P4>v;= DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
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SIGNATURE OF LICENSE HOLDER 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Second Affidavit of Kip Wadsworth 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY (02 67) 
STANFORD P. FITTS (4834) 
BEESLEY, FAIRCLOUGH, CANNON & FITTS 
300 Deseret Book Building 
4 0 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3500 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
F.M. ELECTRIC, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, MCNEIL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY and AMERICAN CASUALTY 
OF REDDING, PA, a surety company, 
Defendants. 
SECOND 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIP WADSWORTH 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920000052CV 
Judge Robert W. Daines 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
KIP WADSWORTH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
says: 
1- I am the General Manager of Ralph L. Wadsworth 
Construction Company ("Wadsworth") and have personal knowledge of 
the matters stated in this Affidavit. 
2. Wadsworth has paid to FM Electric all amounts under its 
1 
Subcontract on the UDOT highway project known as Tremonton to 
Plymouth, Project No. I-ID-15-8(87)380. The only amounts yet to 
become due to FM Electric is retention in the amount of $5,114.31, 
which amount is still being retained by UDOT and has not been 
released to Wadsworth. 
3. All of Wadsworthfs other subcontractors on this project 
have acknowledged that they are not entitled to payment and release 
of retention until UDOT releases the retention amounts and makes 
final payment to Wadsworth. 
Dated this J"1 day of May, 1992. 
i 
Kip Wadsworth 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this P\ day of May, 199 2. 
Notary Public,, 
Residing in ___; ~^_ 
My Commission expires: 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be mailed, United States Mail, First Class, postage 
prepaid, to the following this /^ * day of May, 1992: 
Robert F. Babcock 
Randy B. Birch 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, # 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
3 
ADDENDUM 3 
Notice of Tender of Payment 
(Check Attached) 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY (0267) 
STANFORD P. FITTS (4834) 
BEESLEY, FAIRCLOUGH, CANNON & FITTS 
300 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3500 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
F.M. ELECTRIC, INC., : 
Plaintiff, : 
NOTICE OF TENDER OF 
vs. : PAYMENT 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH CONSTRUCTION : 
COMPANY, MCNEIL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY and AMERICAN CASUALTY : 
OF REDDING, PA, a surety company, Civil No. 920000052CV 
Defendants. 
Defendant Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company 
("Wadsworth"), hereby submits its Notice of Tender of Payment. All 
parties and the Court are hereby notified that in an effort to 
resolve this litigation, and reduce the costs associated therewith, 
Wadsworth has made payment to plaintiff in the amount of $6,035.81. 
Payment was made by means of a check in said amount payable 
to plaintiff and its attorney (A copy of which is attached herewith 
as Exhibit "A") and cover letter (A copy of which is attached 
1 
herewith as Exhibit "B"). The check was hand delivered to 
plaintiff's counsel on June 23, 1992. The check contained no 
restrictive endorsement and said payment was not contingent upon 
a release by plaintiff. Wadsworth's calculations, however, show 
that under any resolution of this litigation, plaintiff would not 
be entitled to recover against Wadsworth any amount in excess of 
the $6,035.81 tendered to plaintiff. 
Dated this ^ y ~ day of June, 1992. 
BEESLEY, FAIRCLOUGH, CANNON & FITTS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this 2 2 L ? ^ a y o f 
June, 1992: 
Robert F. Babcock 
Randy B. Birch 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, # 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
ECX DATE: 6/15/92 CHECK NO 




RALPH L. WADSWORTH 
CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. 
1776 SO MAIN 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84115 
(801) 486-2376 
FACSIMILE NO (801) 466-2859 




FM ELECTRIC AND 
RANDY BIRCH (ATTORNEY) 
7117 SOUTH 400 WEST #6 
MIDVALE , UT 84047 




3 7 1 6 4 
CHECK NO. 
AMOUNT J ,ii£ 
$ * * * * * 6 0 3 5 . 8 1 
k* ,.DATE . $ § 
6 / 1 5 / 9 2 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. 
SALT LAKE 0 ^ 0 3 7 ^ 8 4 1 1 5 
VOID AFTER 90 DAYS 
^ ^ 
ii'0 3?iE.ttiia i : L a t , 3 0 i 0 5t,i: a i C U E 3 a ?«• 
B E E S L E Y , F A I R C L O U G H , C A N N O N & F I T T S 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
4 0 E A S T S O U T H T E M P L E S U I T E 3 0 0 
SALT L A K E C ITY , U T A H tf-4111 
T E L E P H O N E (SOI ) 5 3 S - 2 I O O 
FAX (SOI) J » 3 S - 2 I 3 0 
S T A N F O R D P. F ITTS, P C . 
June 17, 1992 
Randy B. Birch, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: FM Electric v. Wadsworth 
Dear Randy: 
On June 2, 1992, I communicated to you Wadsworth fs offer to 
make payment to FM Electric of the principal retention amount held 
by Wadsworth of $5,114.31 together with interest at 10% per annum 
from the end of November of 1990. Wadsworth made this offer in an 
effort to end this litigation notwithstanding the fact that they 
have not yet been paid by UDOT. Wadsworth can sympathize with FM 
Electric1 s position in not having been paid its retention. At the 
same time, I am sure that FM Electric can understand Wadsworth's 
situation in not having been paid the final amount by UDOT of 
approximately $350,000.00. Nevertheless, in an effort to resolve 
this matter, and avoid further legal costs to the parties, 
Wadsworth offered to make payment now. 
As you know, the Subcontract clearly states that Wadsworth 
will pay FM Electric when Wadsworth is paid by UDOT. I further 
indicated to you that Mr. Montoya, in his conversations with Kip 
Wadsworth, did not dispute that the intent of the Subcontract was 
that FM Electric would not be paid its retention amount until 
Wadsworth1s retention funds were released by UDOT. Furthermore, 
the exact amount to become due to FM Electric cannot be determined 
at this time because UDOT has not yet determined the final 
quantities on the project for payment purposes. UDOT is now in the 
process of making these determinations. Under these circumstances, 
the cases cited by FM Electric in its memoranda cannot be applied 
to change the intent of the agreement between the parties. Even 
if the Court rewrites the Subcontract to require payment within a 
reasonable time even without payment from UDOT, there is no 
indication under the present circumstances that an unreasonable 
time has passed. 
On June 15, 1992, I telephoned you regarding the offer of 
settlement since I had not had any response from you. You 
confirmed that the $5,114.31 was the correct principal amount of 
retention and that the amount claimed in the Complaint contained 
a doubled amount for interest. On June 17, 1992, I received your 
Randy B. Birch, Esq, 
June 23, 1992 
Page 2 
letter and counter-offer from FM Electric to settle this matter for 
$8,000.00. We can see no basis for this amount since we are in 
agreement on the principle amount of $5,114.31 retention and the 
interest does not begin to approach this figure. As you know, the 
retention amount would only yield interest of less than 5% and 
would begin to accrue until sometime after the project, if at all. 
Wadsworthfs calculation of interest at the 10% offered brings the 
total of principal and interest to $6,035.81 (Interest from the end 
of November, 1990, on the principal retention amount and on the 
$1,322.70 paid in February, 1992). This amount is well in excess 
of any amount to which FM Electric would be entitled regardless of 
the outcome of the legal issues in this suit. 
__After receiving your letter on June 17, 1992, I called your 
office to discuss this matter further. You indicated that your 
client would not settle this matter for the amount offered and 
would continue to pursue the litigation even if he was paid 
$6,035.81. Mr. Montoyafs position demonstrates a vexatious and 
unreasonable approach to this litigation. 
Nevertheless, in order to expedite this matter and in the hope 
Mr. Montoya will see the reasonableness of ending this litigation, 
enclosed is a check in the amount of $6,035.81 payable to FM 
Electric and its attorneys. A Lien Waiver is enclosed for 
signature if Mr. Montoya sees fit to end this matter. In any 
event, the check does not include any restrictive endorsement or 
release and is not contingent upon a release or dismissal. 
However, under any outcome of the lawsuit, FM Electric would not 
be entitled to any more than the amount of the enclosed check. 
Wadsworth has made every effort to resolve this matter and put 
an end to the litigation. The enclosed payment is a further effort 
to this end. Please advise as to the status of the pending motions 
and the case in view of the enclosed payment and whether a hearing 
and continued litigation will still be necessary. 
Sincerely, 
BEESLEY, FAIRCLOUGH, CANNON & FITTS 




Letter from Walstad & Babcock, 2/8/93 
ROBERT F. BABCOCK, P.C. 
PAUL J. WALSTAD. P.C. 
BRIAN J. BABCOCK 
DARREL J. BOSTWICK 
STEVEN D. CRAWLEY 
CYNTHIA B. NEUENSCHWANDER« 
MARK L. POULSENI 
JEFFERY R. PRICE* 
KENT B. SCOTT 
STEPHEN O. TAYLOR 
DANIEL G. WORTHINGTON 
©ADMITTED ONLY IN CALIFORNIA 
tALSO AOMITTEO IN ILLINOIS 
tALSO ADMITTED IN PENNSYLVANIA 
February 8, 1993 
Ronald C. Barker, Esquire 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Re: F.M. Electric Company v. Wadsworth/McNeil 
Dear Mr. Barker: 
It has been proposed by Mr. Fitts, and in accordance with the agreement of your 
clients that defendants would be willing to waive or forego their judgment against F.M. 
Electric Company if F.M. Electric Company would withdraw its appeal now pending in the 
Utah Court of Appeals. After consultation with F.M. Electric Company, it is the position 
of F.M. Electric that it is unwilling to withdraw its appeal in this matter unless, in addition 
to foregoing the judgment, defendants are willing to pay to F.M. Electric at least $3,500.00 
to compensate F.M. Electric for the attorney's fees it has had to incur in this matter. I have 
discussed this matter with Mr. Fitts who informs me that Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction 
Company is unwilling to pay any more money to F.M. Electric. However, Mr. Fitts also 
informs me that if your clients are willing to consider F.M.'s counteroffer then Wadsworth 
may be willing to reevaluate its position. 
In order to provide you with an opportunity to discuss this matter with your client and 
at the same time allow this office sufficient time to prepare F.M. Electric's initial brief in time 
for the February 18, 1993 filing date, I would appreciate a response from you to F.M. 
Electric's counteroffer for settlement no later than 5:00 p.m. on Monday, February 15, 1993. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
JRP/jrp/D-5/Q283/LTRS,Q5 
cc. Stanford Fitts, Esquire 
Frank Montoya, F.M. Electric Co. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
A PARTNERSHIP OF 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS AT LAW 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK BUILDING 
254 WEST 400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
(801) 531-7000 
FAX: (801) 531-7060 
PROVn OFF1CF 
COTTONTREE SQUARE SUITE 9C 
2230 NORTH UNIVERSITY PARKWAY 
PROVO. UTAH 84604 
(801) 377-5777 
FAX: (801) 377-8877 
